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Abstract—We study the effects of allowing paid prioritization
arrangements in a market with content provider (CP) competi-
tion. We consider competing CPs who pay prioritization fees to
a monopolistic ISP so as to offset the ISP’s cost for investing
in infrastructure to support fast lanes. Unlike prior works,
our proposed model of users’ content consumption accounts
for multi-purchasing (i.e., users simultaneously subscribing to
more than one CP). This model allows us to account for the
“attention” received by each CP, and consequently to draw a
contrast between how subscription-revenues and ad-revenues are
impacted by paid prioritization. We show that there exist incen-
tives for the ISP to build additional fast lanes subsidized by CPs
with sufficiently high revenue (from either subscription fees or
advertisements). We show that non-prioritized content providers
need not lose users, yet may lose revenue from advertisements due
to decreased attention from users. We further show that users will
consume a wider variety of content in a prioritized regime, and
that they can attain higher welfare provided that non-prioritized
traffic is not throttled. We discuss some policy and practical
implications of these findings and numerically validate them.
Index Terms—Paid prioritization, network economics, multi-
purchasing, net neutrality, smart data pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network (net) neutrality, or the principle that Internet
service should be agnostic to the content of its traffic, has
been a controversial part of Internet regulatory policies for
several years. In the United States, much of the legal debate
on net neutrality centers around the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC)’s authority to impose such regulations on
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Until 2017, the feasibility
of offering many policies, including paid prioritization, or
allowing content providers (CPs) to pay ISPs in order to
guarantee better quality-of-service (QoS) for their users [1],
was widely debated. However, while net neutrality regulations
remain in some parts of the world [2], they expired in 2018
in the U.S., on the grounds that the FCC does not have the
required authority to impose them on ISPs [1]. The ongoing
deployment of fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks, which
provide differentiated QoS based on individual application
needs, may reignite these debates by opening the door to
payment-based QoS differentiation, a version of paid prior-
itization that arguably violates some interpretations of net
neutrality regulations [3].
A. Network Neutrality Debates
One of the key rationales outlined in the FCC’s plans for
their 2018 ruling was the lack of incentives by ISPs to invest in
new infrastructure given existing regulations [4]. Indeed, most
ISPs hailed the FCC ruling as paving the way for them to offer
new services like paid prioritization, giving them new ways to
conduct business beyond pricing users’ access. In particular,
several ISPs have taken the stance that content providers who
are the “big users of bandwidth” should bear the costs of
building the additional infrastructure needed to handle their
increasing traffic [5], [6]. ISPs’ added pricing power in light
of the FCC’s rulings could therefore provide the incentives
and capital that they require to invest in additional network
infrastructure [7].
While ISPs’ stance and the FCC’s policy arguments have
been driven by the effect of regulations on the Internet
infrastructure, allowing for paid prioritization has inevitably
raised questions about its effects on content providers, and
in particular, users’ access to content. Most content providers
have condemned the FCC ruling for allowing ISPs too much
control over consumer choices; nonetheless, smaller competi-
tors have been at the forefront of these oppositions, with larger
providers being less vocal [8], [9]. For instance, the CEO of
Netflix stated that, while an important issue, net neutrality was
not a “primary battle” for them as they are “big enough to get
the deals [they] want” [9]. Smaller CPs on the other hand, who
cannot afford to pay for such prioritized service, could be put
at a disadvantage if users gravitate to other content providers
with better QoS. This effect would be particularly acute if ISPs
drive down the QoS of non-prioritized services, effectively
forcing CPs to pay for prioritization. Thus, we might expect
that paid prioritization would have limited effect on larger CPs,
but hurt smaller ones.
We analytically evaluate these arguments for and against
paid prioritization in a model with competing CPs, of vary-
ing size and revenue models, who enter paid prioritization
agreements with an ISP. We find that (1) there indeed exist
incentives for bigger CPs (either those charging high enough
subscription fees, or those making sufficient revenue from
advertisements) to offset the ISP’s costs in constructing ad-
ditional infrastructure in order to prioritize their traffic. We
show that (2) such arrangements can lead to an increase in
users’ welfare not only due to improved QoS, but also due
to the greater diversity in the content they consume, since (3)
smaller CPs need not lose users, as long as non-prioritized
traffic maintains its current QoS level.
B. Our Contributions
Several papers have examined the potential consequences
of relaxing network neutrality regulations; see [10], [11] for
surveys. Existing works have analyzed the effects of relaxing
net neutrality regulations both in the absence of content
provider competition over users [12], [13], [14], as well as
under competition between two perfectly substitutable content
providers [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. We extend this literature
by contributing the following:
A new model that captures both content provider
competition as well as multi-purchasing by users (i.e., users
subscribing to more than one of the competing providers).
Such multi-purchasing is increasingly common in streaming
markets; for example, a 2019 study showed that 25% of
Netflix iPhone users also use the recently introduced Disney+
app [20], and 46% of U.S. broadband users subscribe to more
than one over-the-top streaming service [21]. Thus, we model
users’ heterogeneous intrinsic preferences for different content
using a variant of the Hotelling model with multi-purchasing
[22], [23]. We assume that users’ decisions consist of selecting
(at most) two CPs as well as their order of consumption. That
is, users first choose to access a primary content provider (e.g.,
read the news from their preferred outlet, or browse for a
movie to watch on Netflix), and may further choose to access
a secondary provider afterwards (e.g. later read headlines from
a second source as well, or browse for other options on
Disney+). Our model accounts for the different utilities the
users derive from a primary vs. secondary CP due to potential
overlaps in their offered content.1
Intuitively, one might expect that the possibility of
multi-purchasing would blunt the impact of paid prioritization
compared to past models that consider only single-purchasing
by consumers: even if a CP did not have the revenue to
purchase prioritized service, it might be able to maintain some
of its revenue, and thus sustain its business, as consumers’
secondary CP choice. It is less clear, however, how the
resulting impact on CP and ISP revenue will affect ISPs’
willingness to invest in infrastructure upgrades, or users’
welfare. Our proposed model allows us to quantify these
effects by capturing how CPs’ revenues from different sources
(namely, subscriptions and advertisement display) are affected
by the “attention” they receive from their users. In particular,
while all users pay subscription fees to a CP regardless of
the order of access, a CP will attain lower advertisement
revenue from its secondary users. This reduction in ad-revenue
is due to users spending less time on secondary content,
and/or potentially being exposed to the same advertisements
on an earlier platform. Hence, users’ click-through-rates drop
as they reach later content. Our model allows us to evaluate
the resulting changes in CPs’ revenues.
Shedding new light on the potential positive/negative
impacts of paid prioritization on CPs (Corollaries 1 and 2).
We show that if non-prioritized traffic maintains the same
QoS despite a competing CP’s prioritization, then the non-
prioritized CP can still attain the same number of users.
That being said, some of these users will designate the non-
prioritized CP to be their secondary content of choice. Due
to this lowered attention from users, non-prioritized CPs who
1Our analysis of users’ choice of primary and secondary CPs is based on
a first-order approximation of users’ utility from multiple CPs and is adopted
for tractability.
are reliant on ad-revenue will realize less profit in a prioritized
regime.
We note that this finding is in contrast with prior works
that had not accounted for users’ multi-purchasing [17], [18],
[16]. In particular, as users access only one of two competing
CPs in these models, when one of the CPs is prioritized, its
competitor will lose users (even if its QoS is not lowered);
the competitor would then lose both advertisement and/or sub-
scription revenue. Our analysis therefore provides new insights
into how competing CPs are affected by paid prioritization
depending on their revenue models and users’ consumption
behavior. In particular, unlike what we might expect from CPs’
stated arguments against paid prioritization, the resulting CP
revenue is just as dependent on the type of revenue as the size
(in terms of revenue rates) of the CP.
These findings shed light on the potential impacts of
paid prioritization on the different business models adopted
by competitors in the “streaming wars” [24], [25]. Current
providers’ offerings include subscription based (e.g. Netflix,
Disney+), ad-based (e.g. Tubi, the Roku Channel), and hybrid
offerings (e.g. Peacock, Hulu, Quibi). The increasing number
of (upcoming) ad-supported streaming services suggests that
a switch to free ad-based or cheaper ad-supported models
instead of pricey subscriptions may provide these services with
a competitive advantage [25], [26], [27]. Our results highlight
the potential effects of paid prioritization on such business
models: they may make CPs more vulnerable to prioritized
competitors.
Analysis of user welfare (Corollary 4). Lastly, we show
that the described prioritization arrangements will lead to
an increase in users’ welfare. This is not only due to the
improvement of QoS for the prioritized CPs’ users, but also
as more users will be multi-purchasing (and hence be exposed
to a wider variety of content) when prioritization is allowed.
These may help to rebut CP fears that paid prioritization will
stifle competition and inhibit the variety of content viewed by
users. Figure 1 illustrates our findings.
Policy and practical implications (Section V). The above
results heavily rely on a “no throttling” condition, i.e., that
non-prioritized traffic is not slowed down. In particular, we
show that in the absence of this assumption, non-prioritized
CPs will lose users, and therefore their revenues from sub-
scriptions will also decrease. We thus validate CP fears that
if ISPs drive down the QoS of non-prioritized traffic (either on
purpose, or due to restructuring of their resources), it could
drive them out of business. In addition, even though the variety
of users’ content consumption may still increase, depending on
the extent of decrease in QoS of non-prioritized content, users’
welfare may decrease as well. Regulators might then seek to
impose this condition in order to ensure that paid prioritization
benefits users and CPs as well as ISPs. We elaborate on this
and other implications of our findings in Section V.
Paper organization: We review related work in Section II
before introducing our model in Section III. We characterize
the market equilibrium and discuss our main findings in
Section IV. We discuss practical and policy implications of our
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Fig. 1. Changes in competing CPs’ users and revenues following paid
prioritization of CP1 at the ISP in a 2-CP market. The top (solid) and
bottom (shadowed) boxes show the users’ content choices after and prior
to prioritization, respectively. We show that when accounting for multi-
purchasing of content, CP1 gains users, while the competing CP2 can
maintain the same total number of users. Nonetheless, the non-prioritized
CP2 attains lower ad-revenue due to decreased attention from users.
findings, as well as potential model extensions and limitations
in Section V. We validate our results with numerical studies
in Section VI, and conclude in Section VII. All proofs are
provided in the appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
ISPs’ incentives for capacity expansion have been stud-
ied with monopolistic [16], [17], [28], [29] and competitive
ISPs [12]. These works analyze ISPs’ investment of addi-
tional revenue from paid prioritization into expanding network
capacity, and its effects on user welfare, in models with
two substitutable CPs [16], [17], or in the absence of CP
competition [28], [29], [12], [30], [13]. We complement this
literature by considering both CP competition and users’ multi-
purchasing.
Many works on paid prioritization do not consider CP
competition. Some, in fact, bypass CPs by assuming that users
choose their service classes depending on their CP prefer-
ences [31], [32]. Other works instead bypass user models by
assuming that CPs earn a fixed revenue per unit capacity [33],
[30]. Even models that allow CPs to pay ISPs for prioritization
are generally considered in the context of non-competing CPs,
e.g., if there is a continuum of CPs, and users choose their
usage at each CP independently [34], [12], [13].
The majority of existing work capturing CP competi-
tion [16], [17], [18] has focused on two substitutable con-
tent providers, with competition modeled using the standard
Hotelling model [35] in which users have demands for one
of the two CPs. An exception is the model of [19] in
which users can consume content from one or both providers.
In [19], similar to our work, the CPs’ ad-revenue depends
on users’ attention, with the revenue from secondary users
attenuated. However, the focus of [19] is on exclusive content
distribution (hard fragmentation), with users’ consuming all
content available on their selected ISP. In contrast to these
works, we explicitly model users’ decisions to single vs. multi-
purchase content using a variant of the Hotelling model. Our
more refined model of user demand patterns allows us to find
that a prioritized regime can incentivize users to subscribe to
a greater variety of content.
Our model is similar to the models of Hotelling with multi-
purchasing adopted in [22], [23], [36]. The focus of these
works is however on the pricing strategies of CPs, and on
contrasting the value of single vs. multi-purchasing users to
media platforms when obtaining financing from advertisers. In
contrast, we focus on paid prioritization arrangements and the
ISP’s investment decisions, and examine the implications for
paid prioritization policies. In addition, we adopt a different
model of CP distribution (see also Section V-B).
In terms of CPs’ business models, the majority of existing
work focuses on ad-revenue CPs [16], [17], [18], [19], [12].
Several of these works compare the benefits of prioritization
to big vs. small CPs, with big CPs being those with higher ad-
revenue rates. In contrast to these works, given our model of
single vs. multi-purchasing users, we can distinguish between
CPs’ subscription and advertising revenues. This allows us to
show that the type of CPs’ business models, as well as CP
size, determines the effects of paid prioritization.
Finally, some models consider not paid prioritization but
sponsored content, in which content providers subsidize users’
costs of consuming data, but cannot influence the QoS users
receive. Such sponsorship can lead to bias in favor of larger
CPs [37], even when the sponsorship indirectly affects user
QoS through changing user demands [38]. Our work is com-
plementary to this literature as well.
III. MODEL
A. The Stakeholders
We consider an economy comprised of a monopolistic
Internet service provider, competitive content providers, and
a continuum of users. Throughout, we use she/her for the ISP,
he/his for CPs, and it/its for users. Table I summarizes the
notation.
a) Users: There is a continuum of users of mass 1
with heterogeneous preferences over the available content. We
quantify this heterogeneity by assuming that users’ content
preference distribution follows (a variant of) the Hotelling
model. Hotelling models are commonly adopted in the study of
competitive markets in which users have heterogeneous prefer-
ences over the competing firms, including in prior work on net
neutrality implications on content provider competition [18],
[17], [16].
Formally, we assume users are distributed uniformly at ran-
dom over the [0, 1] interval. LetM CPs sit at equally distanced
points throughout the line, with CPj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}
sitting at j−1
M−1 . Then, the (dis-)utility to a user at position
x from consuming content from CPj is proportional to the
user’s distance, m(x, j) := |x − j−1
M−1 | from the CP , and is
given by tm(x, j). Here, t ≥ 0 is a unit fit/transportation cost,
determining the users’ sensitivity to their consumed content.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATION
Notation Description
M Number of CPs
V Users’ base value from content consumption
x Users’ position on the [0, 1] continuum
m(x, j) Distance of user at x from CPj
t
Transport/fit cost, determining users’ intrinsic pref-
erence for content
θ Users’ residual benefit rate from secondary content
F
Access fee charged to users by the ISP for connec-
tivity
Sj Subscription fee charged to users by CPj
dj QoS/delay experienced by CPj ’s users
d0 Default QoS/delay for non-prioritized traffic
pj(dj)
Prioritization price paid by CPj (per-user) to the
ISP for attaining QoS/delay dj
C(dj) ISP’s cost of building a fast lane with QoS/delay dj
zj
The decision of CPj regarding prioritization, with
zj = 1 (resp. zj = 0) for opting in (resp. not opting)
nj Mass of CPj ’s users
njl
Mass of users accessing CPj as their l-th content
of choice (nj1 and nj2 for primary and secondary
users, respectively)
rj CPj’s revenue rate from displaying advertisements
δ
Rate of reduction in ad-revenue from secondary
users
λ Users’ average traffic/demand rate
Users multi-purchase, i.e., they may choose to consume con-
tent from more than one CP.
In addition to these intrinsic preferences, users are sensitive
to the quality-of-service experienced when consuming con-
tent from CPj . We let dj denote an implicit, monotonically
increasing function of the actual delay or other QoS-related
factors which may hinder users’ content consumption. We
do not explicitly model the mechanism through which QoS
or delays are determined at the ISP (e.g. M/M/1 queues),
instead assuming the ISP has provided sufficient resources (if
needed by building additional infrastructure) to serve the CP’s
users at a certain QoS. We choose the notation/interpretation
of delays dj to draw a parallel with existing models in the
literature which have considered congestion delays as users’
QoS [16], [17], [18]. Users will pay the ISP an access fee F
for connectivity, and further pay a subscription fee Sj to their
selected CP(s).
b) CPs: There are M content providers2 who are com-
peting for users’ attention, and profiting from both advertise-
ments and subscriptions. In particular, content provider CPj
has a revenue rate rj per unit of user demand, from displaying
advertisements to each of his users. Higher rates indicate that
the CP is more efficient at generating ad-revenue, due to,
e.g., optimized ad-display algorithms. CPs can further generate
revenue from charging users a subscription fee Sj ∈ R≥0. In a
2Although our model will assume users consume content from at most
two CPs, we will differentiate between center and end-CPs (which can be
interpreted as mainstream and specialized content, respectively). Therefore,
our conclusions can be attained in a model of at least 3 CPs.
non-neutral Internet, CPs may be offered an option to pay the
ISP for getting their content prioritized, as detailed shortly. In
this paper, to understand the effects of such paid prioritization,
we take subscription fees Sj and ad-revenue rates rj to be
fixed, and focus on CPs’ prioritization decisions.
c) ISP: We consider a monopolistic service provider.
This is motivated by a lack of competition in the US ISP
market, with studies showing that just 30% of US homes
have access to more than one ISP that offers broadband
speeds [39]. The ISP charges users a flat rate access fee
F ∈ R≥0 for connectivity.
3 The ISP can also charge the CPs
for prioritization of their content. Again, as our focus in this
paper is on the effects of prioritization (and also, as we do not
consider ISP competition), we take the fees F to be fixed, and
focus on the ISP’s choice of prioritization offers as detailed
below.
We assume the ISP offers a two-tiered prioritization scheme,
with a “fast lane” and a “default” option. Let d0 denote the
default QoS/delay offered by the ISP. In order to offer a fast
lane with improved QoS/delay d ≤ d0, the ISP should invest in
improving or building infrastructure. We let nC(d) be the cost
to the ISP for offering a fast-lane with QoS/delay d which can
serve n users. We assume the cost function C(·) is decreasing,
differentiable, and convex.4 The ISP then offsets these costs
through prioritization prices charged to the requesting CP(s).
In particular, to provide fast-lane access with QoS/delay dj
to his n users, a CPj will be charged a prioritization fee
of npj(dj) by the ISP, with pj denoting a CP-specific, QoS-
dependent, per-user prioritization rate.5
B. The Utility Functions
a) Users: Consider a user placed at position x; recall
that this position determines the user’s intrinsic preference for
each CP. We adopt a Hotelling model with multi-purchasing,
similar to those proposed in [22], [23],6 to evaluate users’
content consumption choices. In particular, let CPj and CPk
be the primary and secondary content providers selected by
a user; this means that the user first consumes content from
3Note in particular that users’ data consumption volume does not affect
their access fees to the ISP, as for typical broadband or WiFi subscription
plans. Cellular data plans may impose caps or throttling on “heavy” users,
but these do not affect most users.
4The infrastructure cost should account for both the requested QoS/delay
dj , as well as the number of users nj(dj ) at equilibrium given dj . For
instance, consider reservation-based (PMP [31]) delays of the form dj =
nj/Φj , where Φj is the network capacity dedicated to CPj , and let n
′
j
be CPj’s users before prioritization. Then, to serve a prioritized CPj , an
additional network capacity of nj(dj )/dj − n′j/d0 is needed.
5We note that this form of fees allows the ISP to tailor her prioritization
offerings and differentiate between CPs. This is akin to the current negotiations
of CP-specific special peering arrangements. In our numerical simulations
in Section VI, we show that such differentiation will ultimately improve
users’ welfare. This is because under uniform pricing, the ISP may choose to
focus solely on extracting profit from the highest revenue CP in the market.
This prevents other CPs’ users from experiencing better QoS, despite the
willingness of their providers to subsidize dedicated fast lanes.
6Our model extends the 2-CP model of [22] to M ≥ 3 CPs. The model
of [23] considers M providers as well, but distributed on a Salop circle.
In contrast, we consider the distribution on the unit interval to capture the
spectrum of user preferences.
CPj (e.g., reads news articles from its most preferred website),
followed by content from CPk (e.g., later reads headlines from
a second source). Then, a user at x will derive a utility of
Ux(j) = V − tm(x, j)− dj − Sj ,
from its primary provider, CPj , and a residual utility of
U¯x(k) = θ (V − tm(x, k)− dk)− Sk ,
if it also accesses a secondary CP, CPk . Here, V denotes the
base value of consuming any content, and θ < 1 determines
the rate of reduction in content enjoyment beyond the users’
primary choice. This is a first-order approximation; we assume
the rate of reduction θ for the third most preferred content and
beyond is sufficiently small, so that users ignore the utility
derived from consumption of content beyond their primary and
secondary CPs when making their consumption decisions.7
The residual benefit rate θ models the assumption that users
derive less base utility V from providers beyond their primary
content due to spending less time on secondary content and/or
the potential overlaps with their primary CP’s content. For
instance, users would derive less utility from reading news
headlines at a secondary CP after already reading stories
on the same topics at a primary CP. Similarly, they might
derive less utility from watching videos on a secondary CP
if they have already watched videos at their primary CP.
Knowing this, the users are also less sensitive to their intrinsic
preference m(x, k) and the service quality dk for secondary
content. Therefore, all three effects are attenuated for the
users’ secondary CP. Note also that the rate of reduction does
not affect the subscription fees, as these are sunk costs paid by
the users regardless of the order in which they access content.
The total utility of a user at x, who pays access fee F to
the ISP, from content consumption from only CPj , or from a
pair of primary and secondary providers CPj and CPk, will
be given by
Ux({j}) = Ux(j)− F ,
Ux({j, k}) = Ux(j) + U¯x(k)− F , (1)
respectively. Under these utilities users are homogeneous in
their base valuation, delay sensitivity, and rate of consumption
of content from each CP, but differ in their interest in CPs’
content. We note that (standard) Hotelling models have also
been used in prior work [16], [17], [18] to capture users’
intrinsic preferences over two competing content providers,
with users’ utilities given by Ux({j}) (i.e., under single-
purchasing only). Our proposed model will match these prior
models when setting θ = 0; we consider this special case in
Section IV-B. In the following section, we will evaluate users’
optimal choice of content consumption under the more general
multi-purchasing model (i.e., choice of content providers, as
well as their order of consumption).
7Specifically, we can define residual benefit rates θp, with θM < · · · <
θ2 < 1, for a user’s p-th CP of choice among the M CPs. In this paper,
similar to prior work on Hotelling models with multi-purchasing [23], we
limit our analysis to primary and secondary CP choices for tractability.
b) CPs: Let njl be the mass of CPj users that access his
content as their l-th content of choice, and nj = nj1 +nj2 be
the mass of all CPj users. We refer to nj1 and nj2 as CPj ’s
primary and secondary users, respectively. Let zj ∈ {0, 1}
denote whether CPj has opted for prioritization, and dj be
his users’ QoS/delay. Then, CPj ’s revenue is given by
Rj(dj) = njSj + λ(rj(nj1 + δnj2)− zjnjpj(dj)) . (2)
This revenue consists of profit from subscription fees, ad-
vertising revenue from primary and secondary users, and
paid prioritization fees (if any). Here, λ is users’ average
traffic/demand rate, and δ ≤ 1 is a rate of reduction in ad-
revenue from users who choose to access this CP as their
secondary source. For example, users may spend less time on
their secondary CP, and thus see and click on fewer ads; or the
secondary CP may experience a lower click-through rate on
the ads he displays, due to users’ having already seen these ads
on their primary CP. We abstract from modeling these specific
effects, instead encapsulating them in the single parameter δ.
c) ISP: The ISP is a profit maximizer, with profit given
by
Π = F + λ
M∑
j=1
zjnj(pj(dj)− C(dj)) . (3)
This profit consists of users’ access fees, CPs’ prioritization
fees, and the costs of building additional infrastructure.
C. Market Equilibrium
Throughout the next sections, we study the effects of
allowing paid prioritization options on the market equilibrium.
This equilibrium consists of the users’ content choices, their
experienced QoS, the CPs’ choices regarding prioritization,
and the prioritization fees set by the ISP. Our analysis is based
on the following order of decisions:
• The ISP offers prioritization options to the CPs. This
consists of an improved QoS and the prioritization price
that would be charged for it.
• CPs choose whether to opt for prioritization.
• Users decide their content consumption (i.e., choice of
CPs and their order of consumption) based on their
expected QoS given CPs’ choices of prioritization.
To analyze the above market equilibrium, we use the standard
approach of backward induction to find the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the resulting Stackelberg game.
IV. PRIORITIZATION WITH COMPETING CPS
In this section, we first present our main theorem on the
characterization of the market equilibrium. We then discuss
the implications of this theorem on the potential effects of
paid prioritization on different stakeholders through a number
of corollaries.
A. Market Equilibrium with Competing CPs
In evaluating the market equilibrium, we make the following
assumptions on the problem parameters.
Assumption 1. We assume that the basic problem parameters
{V, t, d0, θ, {Sj}, F} satisfy the following conditions:
1) [High base value from content]: V > d0 +
t
M−1 +F +
maxj Sj .
2) [Moderate residual benefit from secondary content]:
maxj Sj
V−d0−
1
2 (maxj Sj+
t
M−1 )
< θ <
minj Sj
V− t
M−1
.
Intuitively, this assumption can be interpreted as follows.
The first condition is similar to the common “full coverage”
assumption adopted also in prior work [18], [17], [16]. Specif-
ically, under part (1), any user can get a positive utility from
consuming content from at least two of the CPs (regardless
of QoS and fees). Therefore, any user in the population will
be consuming at least one content, and will have at least
two CP options to choose from. In addition, by assuming
part (2), we ensure that the residual benefit from secondary
content, θ, is neither too low to preclude multi-purchasing (i.e.,
some users do consume multiple content), but not too high
to make multi-purchasing trivial (i.e., there will exist some
users who subscribe to only one content). This assumption is
new compared to prior work, and is due to our introduction
of potential dual-purchasing behavior by users. We detail the
derivation of each of the above conditions in Appendix B.
We would like to emphasize that the conditions set in
Assumption 1 make our comparisons of the effects of in-
troducing prioritization options broader. In particular, under
this assumption, all potential single-purchasing and dual-
purchasing content consumption patterns will have a non-zero
mass of users. This will allow us to evaluate the effects of
prioritization on the changes in each possible class of users.8
The following theorem characterizes the (unique) paid pri-
oritization agreement offered by the ISP (including the QoS
offered in the fast lane, and the price charged to a prioritized
CP). It also determines the mass and composition of each CP’s
users. Note that the theorem differentiates between the two end
CPs (CP1 and CPM ) and other CPs, as the end CPs are only
competing with one other content provider, while the middle
CPs have two direct competitors.
Theorem 1. Assume the conditions in Assumption 1 are
satisfied. Let τj(dj) :=
1
t
(
V − dj −
Sj
θ
)
. Then,
1) A CPj , j ∈ [2,M − 1], with QoS/delay dj will have
a total of nj = 2τj(dj) users, with n1j =
1
M−1 +
dj+1+dj−1−2dj
2t of them being primary users, and the
remainder as secondary users.
2) A CPj , j ∈ {1,M}, with QoS/delay dj will have a
total of nj = τj(dj) users, with n1j =
1
2 (
1
M−1 +
8We discuss some relaxations of these conditions in Appendix H, and show
that our qualitative results continue to hold as long as some level of dual-
purchasing exists at the non-prioritized outcome. We analyze the extreme case
of θ = 0 (i.e. single-purchasing) in more detail in Section IV-B.
d
j+(−1)1{j=M}
−dj
t
) of them being primary users, and the
remainder as secondary users.
Further, if CPj has a paid prioritization contract with the ISP,
3) The QoS offered to CPj’s users in the fast lane will be
determined by
d∗j := arg min
dj∈(0,d0]
Sj +
1
2 (1 + δ)λrj
t
dj + λτj(dj)C(dj).
4) CPj will be charged a prioritization fee of
pj(d
∗
j ) =
Sj +
1
2 (1 + δ)λrj
λt
·
d0 − d
∗
j
τj(d∗j )
.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 1. At the heart of our analysis and findings is the
term τj(dj) =
1
t
(
V − dj −
Sj
θ
)
. Intuitively, any user who is
at distance of τj(dj) or less from CPj (as measured in the
Hotelling model) will derive benefit from CPj ’s content as
a secondary user. This threshold is decreasing in dj and Sj ,
indicating that users are less interested in a content when it
has lower QoS or higher subscription fee. The threshold is
further increasing in θ, meaning that as the residual benefit
from secondary content increases, more users adopt it.
Our findings in Parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 indicate
that this threshold can in fact also determine the total number
of users that a CP can attract when competing with each
of his neighboring CPs. This is because we find that once
users lose interest in a CPj as their secondary provider, their
distance from CPj is “far”, in the sense that they would also
prefer a competing CPj±1 to CPj as their primary provider.
In other words, we show that the CPs have a better chance
of gaining the users who are less intrinsically interested in
them as secondary users, as such users could still continue
primarily consuming their most preferred content.
B. Interpretation and Implications
We now discuss the implications of Theorem 1 through a
number of corollaries; all proofs are given in the appendix.
1) Changes in CPs’ users: We begin by evaluating the
change in users’ content consumption. The following lemma
establishes users’ distribution before prioritization.
Lemma 1. In a non-prioritized regime, each CPj , j ∈ [2,M−
1], has nj = 2τj(d0) users, with n1j =
1
M−1 of them being
primary users, and the remainder as secondary users. For an
end CPj , j ∈ {1,M}, nj = τj(d0) and n1j =
1
2
1
M−1 .
This lemma follows directly from Theorem 1 when substi-
tuting dj = d0, ∀j, in Parts (1) and (2). Note that without
prioritization, all (non-end) CPs attain the same number of
primary users, yet those with smaller subscription fee Sj
(hence, larger τj) attract more secondary users.
The next corollary describes the changes in the users of a
CP, as well as his competitors, following prioritization.
Corollary 1. Assume CPj , j ∈ [2,M−1], has a prioritization
agreement with improved QoS/delay d∗j < d0, while his
competitors maintain the default QoS/delay of d0. Then,
{CPj} {CPj , CPj+1} {CPj+1, CPj}{CPj+1}
{CPj} {CPj , CPj+1} {CPj+1, CPj} {CPj+1}
Before:
After:
Fig. 2. Changes in users’ content consumption between CPj and CPj+1
when CPj is prioritized. The top/bottom boxes represent the mass of users
before/after prioritization, and {CPi, CPk} indicates the mass of users with
primary CPi and secondary CPk . Note that CPj+1 maintains the same total
number of users, but has fewer primary users.
1) The prioritized CPj gains 2
d0−d
∗
j
t
additional users. Half
are additional primary users, while the other half are
additional secondary users.
2) The competitors CPk, k ∈ {j − 1, j + 1} will have the
same total number of users. However, 12
d0−d
∗
j
t
of CPk’s
primary users will switch their consumption pattern,
relegating CPk to their secondary content of choice.
For an end CPj , j ∈ {1,M}, the corollary holds by dropping
the factor 2 in part (1).
Interpretation: By opting for prioritization, a CPj can
gain both primary and secondary users. The gain in pri-
mary users comes from the users who had dual-purchased
CPj ’s content as their secondary content of choice prior
to prioritization. Given the improved QoS, these users now
re-order their consumption, choosing CPj as their primary
source. The remaining gain in users comes from those who
were single-purchasing from one of CPj’s competitors before
prioritization. Given the increase in CPj ’s quality, these users
will now have sufficient incentive to subscribe to CPj as well,
consuming his content as a secondary source. Lemma 1 and
Corollary 1 are illustrated in Figure 2.
Remark 2. If one of the competitors of CPj , say CPj+1,
is also prioritized to d∗j+1 < d0, then CPj will still gain
2
d0−d
∗
j
t
users. However, only 12 (
d0−d
∗
j
t
+max{
d∗j+1−d
∗
j
t
, 0}) of
them will be additional primary users (who might re-order
their content consumption to prioritize CPj ), depending on
which CP has attained a better prioritized QoS. This means
that ISPs’ differentiation of CPs when offering fast lanes will
not affect their ability to gain users (given the no-throttling
assumption), but affects the additional attention they can get.
Takeaway: A prioritized CP gains new users, and can fur-
ther get additional attention from his existing users depending
on his competitors’ QoS. Non-prioritized CPs do not lose
users, but lose the attention of some of their existing users.
2) Change in CPs’ revenues: We now evaluate how the
CPs’ revenues are affected by prioritization decisions.
Corollary 2. Assume CPj establishes a prioritization contract
with improved QoS/delay d∗j < d0, while his competitors
maintain the default QoS/delay of d0. Then,
1) The prioritized CPj’s revenue is equal to the revenue
prior to prioritization.
2) The revenue of a (non-prioritized) competitor CPk (k =
j ± 1) will decrease by λrk(1−δ)2t (d0 − d
∗
j ).
Interpretation: First, we note that as the ISP is monopo-
listic, she can choose to extract the entire surplus gained by a
prioritized CP as a prioritization price, while still making the
CP (weakly) incentivized to opt for prioritization. The loss in
the competitor CP’s revenue on the other hand is due to the
reduction in primary users (as shown in Corollary 1). That is,
although the total number of the competing CP’s users does
not change (hence, no change in subscription revenue), some
users re-order their consumption to first access the prioritized
CP, and therefore, reduce the competitor’s ad-revenue.
From Corollary 2, we observe that prioritization of a
competitor will be most damaging to the revenue of content
providers that are reliant on advertising. In particular, a CP
making profit solely from subscriptions would be indifferent
to his competitors’ prioritization, as, by Corollary 1, the
total number of the CPs’ users will remain unchanged. This
conclusion is however dependent on our assumption that pri-
oritization does not affect the QoS of non-prioritized content,
as discussed in the following remark.
Remark 3. By Theorem 1, the total number of a CP’s users
is given by nj = τj(dj) =
1
t
(V − dj −
Sj
θ
). Hence, if dj
is (purposefully) degraded, the CP will lose users. Further,
we have assumed that separate fast lanes are constructed to
handle prioritization (i.e., fixed dj = d0 for non-prioritized
content). Nonetheless, prioritization might be achievable by
restructuring existing ISP infrastructure. In particular, given
a fixed capacity, fewer resources would be dedicated to non-
prioritized traffic, thus reducing the QoS of non-prioritized
content. This lowered QoS guarantees could reduce the total
number of users of non-prioritized CPs at equilibrium, hence
reducing their subscription-based revenues as well.
Takeaway: Despite not losing users, non-prioritized CPs
will have lower revenue due to reduced attention from their
users, and hence, reduced advertising revenue. If the non-
prioritized CPs’ QoS decreases, they will lose revenue from
subscriptions as well.
3) QoS attainable by each CP: We next determine how the
subscription fee and revenue rate of a CP affect the QoS he
can afford to attain for his users through prioritization.
Corollary 3. Let C(d0) = 0 (i.e., there already exists
infrastructure to serve the traffic at the standard QoS),
and limd→0 C(d) = ∞ (negligible delays are prohibitively
costly/infeasible). Then,
1) The users of CPj will get a fast lane with QoS/delay
d∗j < d0 if and only if |C
′(d0)| <
Sj+
1
2 (1+δ)λrj
λ(V−d0−
Sj
θ
)
.
2) If the above condition holds, the fast lane’s QoS is
increasing (d∗j is decreasing) in both Sj and rj .
Interpretation: As intuitively expected, Corollary 3 states
that not all CPs can afford to compensate the ISP for the
construction of fast lanes. Recall that the cost function C(·)
is decreasing, with a larger |C′(·)| indicating a more steep
increase in cost for improving QoS. Therefore, only CPs with
sufficiently high revenue rates (either high Sj or high rj ) may
be able to afford to offset the costs of fast lane construction.
Further, higher revenue CPs can afford to offset the ISP’s cost
for higher QoS fast lanes.
It is also interesting to note that as V increases, or as d0
decreases (i.e., if the default QoS is relatively high), each CP
has a higher mass of users even in the absence of prioritization,
which in turns also decreases the CP’s interest in offsetting the
ISP’s costs for fast lane construction.
Takeaway: As intuitively expected, only CPs with suf-
ficiently high subscription fees or advertising revenue may
be able to pay for fast lanes. Among paying CPs, those
with higher subscription fees or higher ad-revenue rates can
negotiate higher QoS.
4) Users’ welfare: We next compare users’ welfare under
the assumption that non-prioritized traffic is not slowed down.
Corollary 4. Assume CPj has a prioritization agreement
with improved QoS/delay d∗j < d0, while his competitors
maintain the default QoS/delay d0. Then, the introduction of
prioritization increases users’ welfare.
Interpretation: When content from CPj is prioritized,
his users experience higher QoS. As such, the utility from
any user who was already consuming content from this CP
before prioritization, as well as that of his new secondary
users, increases following prioritization. We also show that
multi-purchasing users who switch their order of consumption
in favor of the prioritized content attain a higher utility.
Therefore, users with any consumption pattern attain higher
utility than prior to the introduction of prioritization.
We note that there are two driving factors in the improve-
ment of user welfare: (1) users’ QoS improves (which is also
the driving factor of welfare improvement in prior work on
paid prioritization), and (2) additional welfare is generated
due to the increased variety of content consumption from the
new secondary users of CPj (which is new to our model); in
particular, these users continue to attain the same utility from
consuming primary content from a competitor, while now also
getting added utility from secondary content consumption.
We note that the fact that the non-prioritized contents
retain the same QoS as before is crucial for the conclusion
of Corollary 4. If the traffic of competitors is throttled (or
congested) following CPj ’s prioritization, the utility of users
consuming competitors’ content would degrade. Depending
on the extent of this degradation, overall user welfare may
decrease. A similar conclusion has been made under other
models of CP competition and user content consumption [28],
[30].
Takeaway: As long as prioritization is attained through
building additional infrastructure (while maintaining the same
QoS for non-prioritized content), users’ welfare increases
under prioritization due not only to improved QoS (as is also
the case in prior work), but also due to increased variety of
content consumption (which is new to our model). This result
may not hold if non-prioritized contents is throttled or slowed
down.
5) Single vs dual-purchasing: Finally, we characterize the
market equilibrium for a model without dual-purchasing, by
setting θ = 0 in our proposed model.
Theorem 2. Assume that the first part of Assumption 1 is
satisfied (i.e., full market coverage), and that θ = 0 (i.e., users
only single-purchase). Then,
1) A CPj , j ∈ [2,M − 1], with QoS/delay dj will have a
total of nj =
1
M−1 +
dj+1+dj−1−2dj
2t +
Sj+1+Sj−1−2Sj
2t
users.
2) A CPj , j ∈ {1,M}, with QoS/delay dj will have
a total of nj =
1
2 (
1
M−1 +
d
j+(−1)1{j=M}
−dj
t
+
S
j+(−1)1{j=M}
−Sj
t
) users.
Further, let nj(dj , dj±1) be the number of users determined
in (1) and (2) above, evaluated at a given QoS/delays profile
d. Then,
3) The QoS offered to prioritized CPs’ users will be deter-
mined by
d∗j := max
dj∈(0,d0]
M∑
j=1
(d0 − dj
t
(Sj + λrj)
+ λnj(dj , dj±1)C(dj))
)
.
4) CPj will be charged a prioritization fee of
pj(d
∗
j ) =
Sj + λrj
λt
·
d0 − d
∗
j
nj(d∗j , d
∗
j±1)
,
Interpretation: From Parts (1) and (2), it is easy to see
that prioritization of a CPj ’s competitor (decrease in dj±1)
will reduce the number of users of the CP. In contrast, when
accounting for dual-purchasing, prioritization of competitors
will only reduce the attention received by a CP, as this CP
can still have a chance to serve as the secondary provider
for his competitor’s primary users. Further, from Parts (3)
and (4), we observe that unlike Theorem 1, prices charged to
prioritized CPs depend on those charged to their competitors.
In particular, from Part (4), we note that if CPj ’s competitor
has paid for prioritization, then the ISP can charge a higher
prioritization fee to CPj . This is because the ISP can exploit
the fact that a CP is necessarily at a disadvantage (regardless
of his business model) when competitors are prioritized, and
hence has additional incentive/pressure to pay for prioriti-
zation. These conclusions are largely similar to prior work
studying CP competition using single-purchasing Hotelling
models [18], [17].
Takeaway: The negative impacts of prioritization of com-
petitors on non-prioritized content is less severe when users
purchase from multiple content providers. If users only single-
purchased, non-prioritized content providers would lose users,
and would have to pay higher prioritization fees for the same
QoS once their competitors have been prioritized.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Policy and Practical Implications
a) On the need for the “no throttling” assumption:
We first note that an important assumption underlying our
conclusions is that non-prioritized traffic is not throttled or
otherwise slowed down by the ISP. From a policy perspective,
this means that allowing paid prioritization, but imposing
no-throttling of the non-prioritized traffic, could lead to an
outcome in which ISPs invest in additional infrastructure
in a way that ultimately benefits users. A number of ISPs
have in fact made implicit or explicit commitments to not
throttle or block lawful content, even without net neutrality
regulations [40]; this suggests that a “no throttling” regulation
could be feasible from all stakeholders’ perspective.
We note that throttling of content (and also its prioritization)
is only of importance if it is discernable by the users. While
our current model considers a continuous QoS parameter di,
our results will hold qualitatively with a discrete model of QoS
sensitivity. In particular, non-prioritized CPs will not lose users
if their users can not discern a drop in their contents’ QoS.
b) How should CPs pay for prioritization?: Our results
suggest that CPs with sufficiently high revenue from either
subscriptions or advertising can afford to pay prioritization
fees. Although we have taken CPs’ revenue rates to be
fixed, this finding also implies that CPs can aim to increase
their revenue (by increasing advertisements, improving their
ad-display algorithms, increasing their subscription fees, or
making their content more valuable to users) so as to be
able to afford fast lanes. In particular, CPs could opt to
offer both ad-based and premium (ad-free) versions, with the
latter providing subscribers with improved QoS. The paying
subscribers would then be indirectly subsidizing the cost of
additional infrastructure that supports their desired experience.
However, the ability to introduce such fees, or increasing
existing fees, will depend on the extent of competition and
the subscription fees set by competitors in the content market.
c) Who should be paying for additional Internet infras-
tructure?: In this paper, we have considered the construction
of new infrastructure that is subsidized by CPs, in return for
better QoS for their users. This approach is in line with views
expressed by some ISPs who have suggested that large CPs
should be paying the ISPs to build infrastructure that can
support their traffic (by either cutting their profit margin, or
charging their own users sufficiently high subscription fees),
as opposed to the ISP having to increase its access fees to all
users so as to be able to expand its infrastructure [5], [6]. The
opposing view adopted by CPs is that the ISPs, and not the
CPs, should be cutting their (already high) profit margins in
response to the need for additional infrastructure. Regardless
of which side pays for the infrastructure, the cost may still
be passed down to users in form of increased fees (either
ISPs’ access fees or CPs’ subscription fees). An analysis of
changes in these fees, the effects of CP and ISP competition
on their ability to adjust the fees, and the potential need for
regulations to protect users from ultimately bearing the cost
of added infrastructure, remain as interesting questions.
d) On the trends of ISPs’ spending in infrastructure:
There has been substantial debate on how ISPs’ investments
in infrastructure are affected by regulations, with conflicting
conclusions on whether broadband investments increased [41],
[42] or decreased [43], [44] following the introduction of net
neutrality laws, and also following the 2018 FCC ruling [45].
We would also like to point out that while the institution of the
type of paid prioritization arrangements we have considered in
this paper could lead to additional infrastructure investments,
the benefits will be limited to the prioritized CPs’ users.
Therefore, both short term and long term effects of the latest
FCC rulings on improving broadband infrastructure and access
for all users remain to be seen.
B. Model Extensions and Future Directions
We close this section by discussing potential extensions of
our model, and opportunities for future work.
We first elaborate on the potential effects of ISP competition
on our conclusions. Due to the absence of ISP competition in
our model, all infrastructure expansion costs are ultimately
passed on to the CP. However, in a competitive ISP market,
each ISP may also have an incentive to enter into exclusive
prioritization agreements with (bigger) CPs, in a way that
increases the ISP’s users. As a result, ISPs may compete
to attract CPs by partially (or fully) covering the costs of
the required infrastructure investments. An analysis of such
markets remains a main direction of our future work.
We further note some potential alternatives for capturing
CPs’ competition. Our proposed model assumes that con-
tent providers are distributed along a line. We adopted this
choice as we believe it can capture some common forms of
competition in the content market. For instance, in capturing
ideological/political placement of news outlets, CPs’ position
could correspond to right, left, or centrist media. Alternatively,
one can consider the distribution of CPs at equally distanced
points on a circle’s circumference (i.e. a Salop circle [23]),
or more generally, let the M providers sit at the vertices of
an M − 1-dimensional simplex, allowing users to fall at the
intersection of any two (or more) types of content.
In addition to altering the content providers’ positions, our
model can be modified to capture different user distributions
and demands. In particular, similar to prior work, our analysis
is based on a uniform distribution of users on the preference
spectrum. Our model can be modified to place user mass away
or closer to specific CPs, so as to capture perceived/observed
user tendency towards certain content. We state the extension
of Theorem 1 to general user distributions in Appendix I, and
find that our results on changes in CPs’ users and revenues
continue to hold qualitatively. We leave further analysis with
alternate user and content provider distributions as interesting
directions of future work.
Lastly, we note that our analysis has focused on competition
between content providers having a non-zero mass of users
prior to the introduction of paid prioritization options. This
is reflective of the competition between established content
providers. However, paid prioritization can disproportionately
affect late entrants to content markets: as major CPs continu-
ally subsidize their own fast lanes, the default QoS available
to non-prioritized content remains too low. In that case, an
entrant CP (e.g. a startup) would have to offer a radically
more valuable service (higher V ) to be able to attract users.
A model capturing the dynamics between existing vs future
entrants remains as another interesting extension.
VI. NUMERICAL VALIDATION
In this section, we first verify our results from Section IV
through numerical simulations. We then discuss additional
insights by considering the effects of different status quo
QoS/delays d0 on the ISP’s revenue, and comparing the results
of our model to those with CP-independent prioritization pric-
ing schemes and prioritization through capacity re-allocation
rather than expansion. We detail the choice of parameters used
in these simulations in Table II.
As detailed in Table II, we choose our simulation parameters
based on the competition between major streaming services
who also invest substantially on content creation [46]. By
making different types of content available, these CPs are
catering to different users’ taste; our Hotelling model could
hence be suitable for modeling users’ intrinsic preferences for
the content offered by each service. Our choices of users’
decision parameters in the Hotelling model and the CPs’
revenue parameters are guided by information about these
streaming services; see Table II.
Offered QoS/delay d∗: We first consider the CPs’ ability
to afford fast lanes, and illustrate the QoS offered to users
of fast lanes at the market equilibrium. We first consider the
ISP cost function C(d) = 1/d− 1/d0. Figure 3 illustrates the
optimal d∗j offered to CPj as a function of Sj and rj , where
the default QoS/delay is d0 = 6, and we vary Sj ∈ [6, 16]
and rj ∈ [1, 4], guided by the estimates described in Table II.
The numerical results are consistent with the solution to the
ISP’s optimization problem derived in part 3 of Theorem 1. We
observe that, as shown in Corollary 3, a CPj will only be able
to afford fast lanes under sufficiently high Sj or rj , with the
offered delay decreasing in both parameters. In particular, the
flat top left of the surface indicates that for low subscription
fees and ad-revnue rates, the CP can not afford prioritization
and hence keeps the default QoS/delay.
We conduct the same analysis for an ISP cost function
C(d) = 2(1/d − 1/d0), i.e., when it is more costly for the
ISP to build fast lanes. The results are illustrated in Figure 4.
As expected, the CPs need to have even higher subscription
fees and revenue rates to afford prioritization.
Changes in CPs’ users: We next illustrate the changes
in CPs’ users, in particular when only a subset of them have
sufficiently high revenue rates to afford prioritized fast lanes.
We consider the ISP cost function C(d) = 2(1/d−1/d0), and
set r = 2.27 for all CPs. We then vary S ∈ [10, 16] for CP1
and CP2, and fix S = 6 for all other CPs. Then, the users of
CPj , j ∈ {3, . . . , 6} will have the default QoS/delay d0, while
those of CP1 and CP2 may be prioritized (c.f. Figure 4). Note
also that CP1’s (only) competitor will be prioritized as well,
while CP2 will still have a non-prioritized competitor, CP3.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the changes in CP1, CP2, and
CP3 total users and primary users, respectively, as CP1 and
CP2’s increasing subscriptions enable them to afford prior-
itization, while CP3 remains non-prioritized. As we would
expect from Corollary 1, despite users’ larger subscription
fees S1 and S2, CP1 and CP2 gain users as they pay for
greater prioritization, while the non-prioritized CP3 retains
the same total number of users (Figure 5), yet loses primary
users (Figure 6). Note also that, consistent with Remark 2,
CP1 does not gain any primary users as he has the same
prioritization contract as his competitor CP2. However, CP2
can gain primary users due to his improved standing compared
to CP3.
a) Users’ welfare: Next, we consider users’ welfare
under prioritization. We consider the same parameters as those
used to compare the changes in CPs’ users above, so that
only CP1 and CP2 may afford prioritization. In Figure 7,
we illustrate the change in users’ welfare for three scenarios:
prioritization of both CP1 and CP2, exclusive prioritization
of CP2, and exclusive prioritization of CP2 while throttling
the non-prioritized contents by 1%, so that dj = 1.01d0, j 6=
2. These observations are consistent with Corollary 4. In
particular, users’ welfare increases with prioritization, with
higher welfare if more CPs are prioritized. However, if non-
prioritized traffic is slowed down, as shown in Figure 7,
prioritization of one content while throttling competing ones
may result in a reduction of users’ welfare. Note also that for
sufficiently high S2, more users adopt the prioritized content
and receive considerably better QoS compared to the default
setting, hence increasing overall welfare in spite of throttling
of non-prioritized content.
b) Effects of the initial QoS/delay d0 on the ISP’s rev-
enue: We next consider the effects of the status quo of the
service offered in the non-prioritized regime on the change in
the ISP’s revenue once paid prioritization is offered. Figure 8
illustrates the increase in the ISP’s revenue relative to the non-
prioritized regime, as a function of d0, for Sj ∈ {6, 10, 16},
when the ISP cost is given by C(d) = 1/d−1/d0. We observe
that the ISP can benefit from prioritization when the initially
offered QoS is lower. In particular, if d0 is lower to begin with,
the ISP’s cost for further improving QoS is too high, and hence
no prioritization contracts are offered. Further, we see that the
ISP’s revenue is increasing in the CPs’ subscription fees. This
trend, which is consistent with Corollary 2, is because the ISP
can charge higher prioritization prices to higher revenue CPs.
Offering CP-independent prioritization options: So far,
we have assumed that the ISP can tailor the pricing charged
for prioritization contracts to each CP, so as to extract the
maximum profit from each provider. We now relax this as-
sumption, by imposing that the ISP should offer a single menu
of prioritization prices p(d), without discriminating between
content providers. In particular, we let CP3 be a content
provider who has higher subscription fees and/or ad-revenue
rates compared to other CPs, and hence can offset the ISP’s
cost for construction of higher quality fast lanes. In this case,
the ISP can decide whether to offer a high priced menu to
extract the maximum profit from this CP, or to offer a lower
priced menu to get more CPs to opt for prioritization.
TABLE II
CHOICE OF PARAMETERS FOR SIMULATIONS. WE CONSIDER THE MAJOR STREAMING SERVICES (NETFLIX, HULU, DISNEY+, ETC), AND CHOOSE OUR
PARAMETERS BASED ON INFORMATION ON THEIR SUBSCRIPTION FEES, AD-REVENUES, USER BASE, ETC, AS DETAILED BELOW.
Notation Description Rationale for choice of value Realistic value
M Number of CPs
Major competitors in streaming who are also content creators (po-
tentially catering to different users’ intrinsic preferences) are Netflix,
Hulu, Amazon Prime, Apple TV+, Disney+, and HBO Max [46]
6
V Users’ base value from content consumption
We set this value relative to the access fees and subscription fees to
capture users’ voluntary participation in the market
100
t
Transport/fit cost, determining users’ intrinsic
preference for content
Studies show that 46% of U.S. broadband users subscribe to more
than one over-the-top streaming service [21]. We set t to roughly get
this level of multi-purchasing at the non-prioritized outcome
500
θ
Users’ residual benefit rate from secondary
content
Based on a 2018 study saying Netflix users spend 10 hours/week and
Amazon/Hulu users 5 hours/week on the platform [47]
0.5
F
Access fee charged to users by the ISP for
connectivity
$50 to $60 monthly fees for broadband access (based on AT&T and
Comcast rates). Further, reports show that around 60% of Internet
traffic is from video streaming services [48]. We use this to estimate
the portion of access fees related to streaming services
33
Sj Subscription fee charged to users by CPj
From $6 to $16, based on the range of Netflix and Hulu monthly
subscription rates (Hulu’s $6 subscription includes ads)
10 or [6, 16]
d0 Default QoS/delay for non-prioritized traffic
AT&T’s average broadband delay is 73ms [49], while the average 4G
delay is around 54ms [50]. To capture the effects of QoS on shaping
users’ choices, we scale this value to make it comparable against the
base value and subscription fees
6 or [5.4, 7.3]
rj
CPj’s revenue rate from displaying advertise-
ments
We let the average value be around $2.27, extrapolating from Hulu’s
$1.5B annual revenue and 55M ad-supported viewers/month [51]
2.27 or [1, 4]
δ
Rate of reduction in ad-revenue from sec-
ondary users
We set this equal to θ based on [47], since both parameters are
reflected in the time spent on the different CPs
0.5
λ Users’ average traffic/demand rate
Netflix minimum speed is 0.5Mbps, 5Mbps for HD and 25 Mbps for
Ultra HD. Our results are invariant to the scaling of this parameter
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Fig. 3. The prioritized CP’s QoS/delay as a function of Sj and rj , for
C(d) = 1/d − 1/d0. CPs with higher subscription fees or revenue rates
can subsidize better QoS for their users.
Fig. 4. The prioritized CP’s QoS/delay as a function of Sj and rj , for
C(d) = 2(1/d − 1/d0). Compared to Figure 3, CPs need higher revenue
rates to afford prioritization, since it is more costly for the ISP to build new
infrastructure.
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the offered fast lane QoS/delays,
and the revenue of CP3, respectively, for C(d) = 1/d−1/d0,
S3 ∈ [12, 18], and r3 ∈ [2, 4]. We observe that once CP3 has
significantly higher revenue rates compared to other CPs, the
ISP switches her offering of prioritization, so as to extract
higher profit by (only) meeting the demands of this CP’s
users (Figure 9). Further, as shown in Figure 10, even though
uniform pricing results in lower QoS than attainable by CP3,
this CP can derive higher profit in the meantime as a result of
lower prices set to meet other CPs’ demands.
These results suggest that if one of the streaming providers
is significantly more profitable than other competitors, and the
ISP can not tailor her offerings to different CPs, then she will
target her prioritization pricing to profit from this CP alone.
Interestingly, if prioritization offerings could be tailored to
CPs, then all other CPs could negotiate prioritization contracts
as well (albeit with lower quality fast lanes). Together with
our findings in Corollary 4 and Figure 7, this means that
offering tailored prioritization options will improve the welfare
of users.
c) Prioritization through capacity re-allocation.: Finally,
we allow the ISP to offer improved QoS by re-allocating
her existing capacity, rather than through building additional
infrastructure. This will inevitably result in throttling of non-
prioritized traffic. In particular, we consider reservation-based
(PMP [31]) delays of the form dj = nj/Φj , where Φj is
the network capacity dedicated to CPj , and nj is the number
of CPj users. We assume one of the middle CPs, say CP3,
is offered an exclusive prioritization contract with improved
QoS/delay d3 ∈ [4, 6]. To provide this fast lane, the ISP
dedicates additional capacity Φ3 to this CP, at the expense
of reduced capacity (hence, worse QoS) for other CPs’ users.
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Fig. 5. Changes in CP1, CP2, CP3 total users
following prioritization of CP1, CP2. Prioritized
CPs gain additional users, while non-prioritized
CP3 can maintain the same total number of users.
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Fig. 6. Changes in CP1, CP2, CP3 primary
users following prioritization of CP1, CP2. Non-
prioritized CP3 gets fewer primary users. Priori-
tized CP1 will not gain additional attention as his
competitor CP2 is prioritized as well.
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Fig. 7. Change in users’ welfare. Prioritization can
increase users’ welfare. However, if non-prioritized
traffic is throttled, users’ welfare may decrease.
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Fig. 8. Change in the ISP’s revenue as a function
of initial QoS/delay d0. The ISP benefits more
from offering prioritization when the default QoS is
lower (higher delay d0), with the profit increasing
in CPs’ subscription fees.
Fig. 9. Changes in equilibrium prioritization de-
lay when prioritization pricing is CP-independent.
Once CP3 has a sufficiently higher revenue rate
than other CPs, the ISP focuses her offerings on
meeting the demand of this dominant CP’s users.
Fig. 10. Changes in the revenue of a dom-
inant CP3 when prioritization pricing is CP-
independent. Although uniform pricing results in
lower QoS than attainable by CP3, this CP can
derive higher profit due to lower prices set to attract
other CPs.
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Fig. 11. Change in CPs’ total number of users,
when CP3 is prioritized through capacity reallo-
cation. Non-prioritized content gets lower users as
it is inevitably throttled.
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Fig. 12. Change in CPs’ primary users, when CP3
is prioritized through capacity reallocation. Non-
prioritized CP2, the direct competitor of CP3, is
losing primary users.
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Fig. 13. Welfare decreases as one of the content
providers, CP3, is prioritized through capacity
reallocation, which inevitably leads to throttling of
non-prioritized traffic.
Figures 11 and 12 show the change in the total number
of users and primary users, respectively, of CP1, CP2, and
CP3 as a function of the delay offered to CP3 who is
exclusively prioritized. First, from Figure 11, we observe that
non-prioritized CPs attain fewer users at equilibrium due to
the degradation of their QoS. Figure 12 shows that CP1 will
not lose primary users (as it is competing with CP2 who has
the same degraded QoS), yet CP2 loses primary users to his
higher QoS competitor CP3. As expected, the gap increases
as CP3 is offered a better prioritization deal (i.e., lower d3).
Figure 13 illustrates the change in users’ welfare following
exclusive prioritization of CP3 for three different values of
S3. We observe that users’ welfare decreases when CP3
is prioritized due to the throttling, and hence reduced QoS
experienced, by other CPs’ users. However, if S3 has high
subscription fees, he can attract fewer users (even if priori-
tized), and therefore the exclusive prioritization of his content
will be less disruptive to other CPs’ users.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the effects of paid prioritization on an ISP’s
incentives for infrastructure investments in a market with
content provider competition. We proposed a new model
that captures users’ heterogeneous preference over competing
CPs, as well as their multi-purchasing of content. We show
that there indeed exist incentives for larger CPs (with high
subscription and/or advertisement revenue) to offset the costs
of fast lane construction. More importantly, our proposed
model allowed us to analyzed the effects of prioritization on
competing CPs with different revenue models, showing that
the resulting CP revenue is just as dependent on the source of
revenue as the size of the CP. In particular, we show that non-
prioritized CPs need not lose users, but may have reduced
ad-revenue due to decreased attention from their users. We
establish that such arrangements can increase users’ welfare
as long as non-prioritized traffic is not throttled, and discuss
the policy and practical implications of our findings.
Our multi-purchasing model, which enabled us to account
for users’ attention to different content, and hence differentiate
between the competing CPs’ subscription and advertisement
revenue sources, could provide new insights in other studies
of paid prioritization and net neutrality implications. These
include extending the current model to also capture ISP
competition, and analyzing CPs’ incentives for modifying their
business models.
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APPENDIX
A. Users’ choice of content consumption
We begin by identifying users’ choices of content con-
sumption (without imposing any assumptions on the problem
parameters). We will use this lemma to derive the conditions of
Assumption 1 and in proving Theorem 1. We use the following
definition throughout the proof.
Definition 1. Define the primary and secondary thresholds for
CPj as
τPj :=
1
t
(Vj − dj − Sj) ,
τSj :=
1
t
(Vj − dj −
Sj
θ
) ,
respectively.
Note that both these thresholds are functions of dj , and
that τPj > τ
S
j . These thresholds denote the maximum distance
from CPj (as defined in the Hotelling model) at which a user
would derive utility from consumption of content from the
CP as its primary and secondary content choice, respectively.
We use these indifference points to determine users’ content
consumption choices between any two CPs, as shown in
the following lemma. Note that users who are single/dual
purchasing between two content providers CPj and CPk
have four consumption options: {j}, {j, k}, {k, j}, {k}, where
{j, k} (resp. {j}) is a bundle in which the user first (resp. only)
consumes content from CPj , and vice versa. Note also that the
following lemma only identifies the best choice among these
four options; users will still choose to opt out of purchasing
their best bundle unless it provides them with non-negative
utility.
Lemma 2. Consider two content providers CPj and CPk,
k > j. Denote the CPs’ positions in the Hotelling model by
Xj :=
j−1
M−1 and Xk :=
k−1
M−1 . Then, the choices of users
Xj < x < Xk between the four potential consumption options
is as follows:
1) If Xj + τ
S
j < Xj + τ
P
j < Xk − τ
P
k < Xk − τ
S
k :
all users with x < Xj + τ
P
j single purchase on CPj
and those with x > Xk − τ
P
k single purchase on CPk.
2) If Xj + τ
S
j < Xk − τ
P
k < Xj + τ
P
j < Xk − τ
S
k :
all users with x < 12 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) single
purchase on CPj and those with x >
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) single purchase on CPk .
3) If Xk − τ
P
k < Xj + τ
S
j < Xj + τ
P
j < Xk − τ
S
k , there
are two possible cases:
a) If 12 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) < Xj+τ
S
j , then users
with x < 12 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) single purchase
on CPj , those with
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) <
x < Xj + τ
S
j dual purchase with primary CPk,
and those with Xj + τ
S
j < x single purchase on
CPk.
b) If Xj+τ
S
j <
1
2 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ), then users
with x < 12 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) single purchase
on CPj , those with
1
2 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) < x
single purchase on CPk.
4) If Xk − τ
P
k < Xj + τ
S
j < Xk − τ
S
k < Xj + τ
P
j , there
are three possible cases:
a) If 12 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) < Xj+τ
S
j , then users
with x < 12 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) single purchase
on CPj , those with
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) <
x < Xj + τ
S
j dual purchase with primary CPk,
and those with Xj + τ
S
j < x single purchase on
CPk .
b) IfXj+τ
S
j <
1
2 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) < Xk−τ
S
k ,
then users with x < 12 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j )
single purchase on CPj , those with
1
2 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) < x single purchase on CPk.
c) If Xk−τ
S
k <
1
2 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ), then users
with x < Xk − τ
S
k single purchase on CPj , those
with Xk − τ
S
k < x <
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j )
dual purchase with primary CPj , and those with
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) < x single purchase
on CPk .
5) If Xk − τ
P
k < Xk − τ
S
k < Xj + τ
S
j < Xj + τ
P
j , there
are three cases:
a) If 12 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) < Xk−τ
S
k , then users
with x < 12 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) single purchase
on CPj , those with
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) <
x < 12 (Xj+Xk)−
(Vk−Vj)−(dk−dj)
2t dual purchase
with primary CPj , those with
1
2 (Xj + Xk) −
(Vk−Vj)−(dk−dj)
2t < x < Xj + τ
S
j dual purchase
with primary CPj+1, and those with Xj + τ
S
j < x
single purchase on CPk.
b) IfXk−τ
S
k <
1
2 (Xk−τ
P
k )+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) < Xj+τ
S
j ,
then users with x < Xk − τ
S
k single purchase on
CPj , those with Xk − τ
S
k < x <
1
2 (Xj +Xk) −
(Vk−Vj)−(dk−dj)
2t dual purchase with primary CPj ,
those with 12 (Xj +Xk)−
(Vk−Vj)−(dk−dj)
2t < x <
Xj + τ
S
j dual purchase with primary CPk, and
those with x > Xj + τ
S
j single purchase on CPk.
c) If Xj + τ
S
j <
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ), then
users with x < Xk − τ
S
k single purchase on CPj ,
those with Xk − τ
S
k < x <
1
2 (Xj + Xk) −
(Vk−Vj)−(dk−dj)
2t dual purchase with primary CPj ,
those with 12 (Xj +Xk)−
(Vk−Vj)−(dk−dj)
2t < x <
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) dual purchase with
primary CPj+1, and those with
1
2 (Xk − τ
P
k ) +
1
2 (Xj + τ
P
j ) < x single purchase on CPj+1.
Proof. The proof involves comparing the utility that users
derive at each consumption bundle, and finding the one that
maximizes their payoff. The utility from each of the four
bundles is given by:
Ux({j}) = Vj − tm(x, j)− dj − Sj − F ,
Ux({j, k}) = Vj − tm(x, j)− dj − Sj+
θ(Vk − tm(x, k)− dk)− Sk − F ,
Ux({k, j}) = Vk − tm(x, k) − dk − Sk+
θ(Vj − tm(x, j) − dj)− Sj − F ,
Ux({k}) = Vk − tm(x, k) − dk − Sk − F .
A comparison across these leads to the lemma.
B. Derivation of the conditions in Assumption 1
We are primarily interested in analyzing a market in which
both single-purchasing and dual-purchasing options can attract
a non-zero mass of users, so as to analyze the effects of
prioritization on changes in all possible consumption bundles.
We will further be interested in outcomes under which the
users have (on average) a higher number of content options
to choose from, implying the highest level of competition
between the CPs, so that users are not trivially defaulting to
certain bundles due to lack of other options.
From Lemma 2 we observe that for such outcomes, the
parameters should be consistent with those under part (5).
Further, the combination in (5-b) provides us with the set of
parameters under which the users have on average a higher
number of bundles to choose from, implying the highest level
of competition between the CPs. We therefore derive the
conditions under which the user choices under (5-b) in Lemma
2 are realized. We repeat the user choices here for each of
reference: for users with Xj < x < Xj+1, with Vj = Vj+1:
• Users with Xj < x < Xj+1 − τ
S
j+1 single purchase on
CPj ,
• Users with Xj+1−τ
S
j+1 < x <
1
2 (Xj+Xj+1)+
dj+1−dj
2t
dual purchase with primary CPj ,
• Users with 12 (Xj + Xj+1) +
dj+1−dj
2t < x < Xj + τ
S
j
dual purchase with primary CPj+1,
• Users with Xj + τ
S
j < x < Xj+1 single purchase on
CPj+1.
Ensuring both single and dual purchasing: First, note the
two extremes at which users single purchase. In order to ensure
non-zero mass on these types of users, we need to have τSj <
1
M−1 , ∀j. This reduces to
(2− UB) θ <
minj Sj
V − t
M−1
In addition, we require Xj+1 − τ
S
j+1 <
1
2 (Xj + Xj+1) +
dj+1−dj
2t < Xj + τ
S
j for the two dual purchasing regions to
be well-defined. Moreover, we require that Xj+1 − τ
S
j+1 <
1
2 (Xj+1−τ
P
j+1)+
1
2 (Xj+τ
P
j ) < Xj+τ
S
j to be within region
(5-b) to begin with. These two conditions together simplify to
requiring that
Xj+1 −Xj < min{2τ
S
j −
dj+1 − dj
t
−
Sj+1 − Sj
t
,
2τSj+1 +
dj+1 − dj
t
+
Sj+1 − Sj
t
,
2τSj −
dj+1 − dj
t
, 2τSj+1 +
dj+1 − dj
t
}
We minimize the upper bound above in order to ensure the
condition is satisfied for all pairs of CPs. This reduces to
finding θ such that
t
M − 1
< 2V − 2d0 −max
j
Sj − 2
maxj Sj
θ
Therefore, the lower bound on θ is given by
(2 − LB) θ >
maxj Sj
V − d0 −
1
2 (maxj Sj +
t
M−1 )
.
High base value from content: Lastly, we derive the full user
market coverage condition and CP competition conditions.
Specifically, we want all users, including the ones with the
lowest utility, to derive positive benefit from participation (i.e.,
full market coverage), and not be forced to choose a CP when
doing so for maximal competition (i.e., have at least two CP
choices). This can be expressed as:
min
{x,j}
{V − tm(x, j)− dj − Sj − F} ≥ 0
In finding the minimum user utility, we note that this would
require users to be at maximum distance from one of their two
CP choices closest to them, m(x, j) = 1
M−1 , have the worst
case QoS/delay, d0, and pay the highest CP subscription fee,
Sj . This leads to requiring
(1) V ≥
t
M − 1
+ d0 +max
j
Sj + F
In terms of the notation of Lemma 2, this condition is
equivalent to requiring τPj ≥
1
M−1 for all CPj .
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Users’ content consumption decisions: We begin by
finding users’ consumption patterns. Take users with j−1
M−1 ≤
x ≤ j
M−1 (that is, those who are primarily interested in CPj
and CPj+1’s content). These users will have four potential
consumption patterns: {j}, {j+1}, {j, j+1} and {j+1, j},
where {j,−j} (resp. {j}) is a bundle in which the user first
(resp. only) consumes content from CPj .
Let τSj (dj) =
1
t
(V − dj −
Sj
θ
). Under Assumption 1,
the consumption choices of these users can, as shown in
Appendix A, is given by
• Users with j−1
M−1 < x <
j
M−1 − τ
S
j+1(dj+1) single
purchase on CPj ,
• Users with j
M−1 − τ
S
j+1(dj+1) < x <
j− 12
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t
dual purchase with primary CPj ,
• Users with
j− 12
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t < x <
j−1
M−1 + τ
S
j (dj) dual
purchase with primary CPj+1,
• Users with j−1
M−1 + τ
S
j (dj) < x <
j
M−1 single purchase
on CPj+1.
Therefore, depending on the relative delays dj and dj+1
once prioritization decisions are made, users’ content con-
sumption can be illustrated as in Figure 14.
CPj CPj+1j−
1
2
M−1 +
1
2
∆dj
t
j
M−1 − τ
S
j+1(dj+1)
j−1
M−1 + τ
S
j (dj)
{CPj} {CPj , CPj+1} {CPj+1, CPj}{CPj+1}
Fig. 14. Users’ content consumption choices.
CPs’ prioritization decisions: Given users’ consumption
choices, we observe that if a CPj lowers his offered delay
dj , then he will serve a larger mass of the user market.
This includes changes in both primary and secondary users.
We evaluate the changes in a CP’s revenue when opting for
prioritization (accounting for the change in his users), so as
to determine the incentive of the CP for paying prioritization
fees.
We first consider the revenue each CPj can attain from
the users he is attracting under competition with one of his
neighbors, CPj+1. For any given pair of delays dj and dj+1,
from the 1
M−1 users that reside between CPj and CPj+1
in the Hotelling model, CPj serves a total of τ
S
j (dj) =
1
t
(V − dj −
Sj
θ
) users, with 12 (
1
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
t
) of them
being primary users, and the remainder as secondary users.
The portion of CPj revenue that is accrued through this
competition is therefore given by
R¯j,j+1(dj) = τ
S
j (dj)(Sj + λδrj − λzjpj(dj))
+ λrj(1− δ)
1
2
(
1
M − 1
+
dj+1 − dj
t
) . (4)
Note that the revenue when CPj does not opt for prioritization
can be obtained by setting dj = d0 and zj = 0 in (4).
Similarly, CPj ’s portion of revenue accrued from competition
with CPj−1, R¯j,j−1(dj), can be derived analogously by
swapping the indices j + 1 with j − 1 in (4). Therefore, the
total revenue to a middle-CP is given by
Rj(dj) = 2τ
S
j (dj)(Sj + λδrj − λzjpj(dj))
+ λrj(1 − δ)(
1
M − 1
+
dj+1 + dj−1 − 2dj
2t
) . (5)
For the two end-CPs, CP1 and CPM , who only have one
competitor, the total revenue is given by R1(d1) = R¯1,2(d1)
and RM (dM ) = R¯M,M−1(dM ), respectively.
Then, CPj will have an incentive to pay the required
prioritization price if the CP’s revenue given in (5) increases
following prioritization compared to his no prioritization rev-
enue at d0. In particular, the prioritization price for delay dj
should be such that Rj(dj) ≥ Rj(d0). Simplifying this, the
price charged to CPj for delay dj should satisfy the following
constraint:
pj(dj) ≤
(τSj (dj)− τ
S
j (d0))(Sj + λδrj) +
1
2 (1− δ)λrj
d0−dj
t
λτSj (dj)
=
Sj +
1
2 (1 + δ)λrj
λt
·
d0 − dj
τSj (dj)
. (6)
The ISP’s choices: Lastly, the ISP’s profit is given by
Π = F +
M−1∑
j=2
λzj2τ
S
j (dj)(pj(dj)− C(dj))
+
∑
j∈{1,M}
λzjτ
S
j (dj)(pj(dj)− C(dj)) .
where C(dj) is the per-user, per-unit of traffic, cost for
building additional infrastructure to provide a delay dj to the
2τSj (dj) users (or τ
S
j (dj) users for end CPs) of a prioritized
provider CPj .
We first note that as the ISP’s profit is increasing in the
prioritization price of any CP, she will charge the maximum
possible price the CP is willing to pay. That is, the price
charged to CPj will bind (6).
The ISP further needs to determine her proposed QoS/delay
dj to CPj . Substituting for the price binding (6), this will be
given by the solution to
max
dj∈(0,d0]
d0 − dj
t
(Sj +
1
2
λ(1 + δ)rj)− λτ
S
j (dj)C(dj) .
If the prioritization arrangements are exclusive, the ISP will
make the offer to the CP(s) from whom she can extract the
most profit.
D. Proof of Corollary 1
Assume CPj has opted for prioritization to get QoS/delay
d∗j , while all other CPs maintain the based QoS/delay d0. From
Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, the change in CPj’s users is given
by
2τj(d
∗
j )− 2τj(d0) = 2
d0 − d
∗
j
t
.
The change in primary users is given by
n1j(d
∗
j )− n1j(d0) =
dj+1 + dj−1 − d
∗
j
2t
.
As long as the other CPs are not prioritized, the above indicates
a change of
d0−d
∗
j
t
in CPj’s primary users. Therefore, half
the total gains are in primary users, and the remainder are
in secondary users. A similar application of the theorem
establishes the result for end-CPs.
E. Proof of Corollary 2
For part (1), from the proof of Theorem 1, we know that
the ISP’s revenue is strictly increasing in the price charged
to CPs for prioritization. The CPs’ incentive for paying for
prioritization on the other hand is given by Rj(dj) ≥ Rj(d0).
Therefore, the ISP charges each CP for improved delays in
a way that that his revenue at any offered delay is equal to
Rj(d0).
For part (2), from the proof of Theorem 1, the revenue of
CPj+1 is given by
Rj+1(dj+1) =
2τSj+1(dj+1)(Sj+1 + λδrj+1 − λzj+1pj+1(dj+1))
+ λrj+1(1− δ)(
1
M − 1
+
dj+2 + dj − 2dj+1
2t
) .
(7)
We assume dj = d
∗
j , and that dk = d0, ∀k 6= j. By
inspecting (7), we note that the change in the revenue of
CPj+1 from changes of dj stems from the last term. When
CPj is prioritized, the change in CPj+1’s revenue will be
given by
λrj+1(1− δ)
d0 − d
∗
j
2t
A similar argument holds for CPj−1.
F. Proof of Corollary 3
The ISP’s choice of delay is determined from
d∗j =arg min
dj∈(0,d0]
Sj +
1
2 (1 + δ)λrj
t
dj + λτj(dj)C(dj).
The first derivative of this (convex) objective function is given
by
Sj +
1
2 (1 + δ)λrj
t
+ λτj(dj)C
′(dj)− λ
1
t
C(dj) .
For the optimization problem to have a root d∗j > d0, we need
for the first derivative to be positive at d0, so that it is optimal
to decrease the delay. That is
Sj +
1
2 (1 + δ)λrj
t
+ λτj(d0)C
′(d0) > 0 .
Or equivalently, that
|C′(d0)| <
Sj +
1
2 (1 + δ)λrj
tλτj(d0)
.
In addition, the optimal QoS/delay d∗j satisfies
(Sj +
1
2
(1+ δ)λrj)+λ(V − d
∗
j −
Sj
θ
)C′(d∗j )−λC(d
∗
j ) = 0 .
As both C(d) and C′(d) are decreasing in d, increasing the
constant rj decreases the root d
∗
j of the above. Further, noting
that C′ < 0, increasing Sj also increases the LHS of the
equation above, and therefore the root d∗j of the above will
decrease. Both of these indicate that the CP with higher Sj or
rj can afford better QoS/lower delay.
G. Proof of Corollary 4
Users’ welfare can be found as the summation of the welfare
of the primary and secondary users of each CP. For instance,
for users with j−1
M−1 ≤ x ≤
j
M−1 (those between CPj and
CPj+1), the welfare of the primary users of CPj is
∫ 0.5
M−1+
∆di
2t
0
(V − dj − Sj − tx)dx ,
and that from secondary users is
θ
∫ τSj (dj)
0.5
M−1+
∆di
2t
(V − dj −
Sj
θ
− tx)dx .
For all users x ∈ [ j−1
M−1 ,
j
M−1 ], the sum of four such expres-
sions can be simplified to
(1− θ)
(
1
M−1 (V −
dj+dj+1
2 −
t
2(M−1) ) +
(dj+1−dj)
2
4t
)
+ θ
t
2
(τSj (dj)
2 + τSj+1(dj+1)
2) .
It is straightforward to show that the above expression is
decreasing in dj and dj+1 over (0, d0]. Therefore, having a
fast lane for either CP will increase welfare. Further, if dj
increases while dj+1 decreases (i.e., CPj+1 prioritized while
CPj throttled), the overall welfare could decrease.
We begin by finding users’ consumption patterns. As θ = 0,
we have τSj → −∞ for all CPs, and therefore we are in either
cases 1 or 2 of Lemma 2. Further, as the condition of part
(1) of Assumption 1 is satisfied, we are in case 2. This means
that for users with j−1
M−1 ≤ x ≤
j
M−1 (that is, those who are
primarily interested in CPj and CPj+1’s content), the content
consumption choices are as follows:
• Users with j−1
M−1 < x <
j−0.5
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t +
Sj+1−Sj
2t
single purchase on CPj ,
• Users with j−0.5
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t +
Sj+1−Sj
2t < x <
j
M−1
single purchase on CPj+1.
CPs’ prioritization decisions: Given users’ consumption
choices, we observe that if a CPj lowers his offered delay dj ,
then he will serve a larger mass of the user market. We evaluate
the changes in a CP’s revenue when opting for prioritization
(accounting for the change in his users), so as to determine
the incentive of the CP for paying prioritization fees.
We first consider the revenue each CPj can attain from
the users he is attracting under competition with one of his
neighbors, CPj+1. The portion of CPj revenue that is accrued
through this competition is therefore given by
R¯j,j+1(dj) = (
0.5
M − 1
+
dj+1 − dj
2t
+
Sj+1 − Sj
2t
)
(Sj + λrj − λzjpj(dj)) (8)
Note that the revenue when CPj does not opt for prioritization
can be obtained by setting dj = d0 and zj = 0 in (8).
Similarly, CPj ’s portion of revenue accrued from competition
with CPj−1, R¯j,j−1(dj), can be derived analogously by
swapping the indices j + 1 with j − 1 in (8). Therefore, the
total revenue to a middle-CP is given by
Rj(dj) = (
1
M − 1
+
dj+1+dj−1−2dj
2t +
Sj+1+Sj−1−2Sj
2t )
(Sj + λrj − λzjpj(dj)) . (9)
For the two end-CPs, CP1 and CPM , who only have one
competitor, the total revenue is given by R1(d1) = R¯1,2(d1)
and RM (dM ) = R¯M,M−1(dM ), respectively.
Then, CPj will have an incentive to pay the required
prioritization price if the CP’s revenue given in (9) increases
following prioritization compared to his no prioritization rev-
enue at d0. Let nj(dj , dj±1) :=
1
M−1 +
dj+1+dj−1−2dj
2t +
Sj+1+Sj−1−2Sj
2t ) for mid-CPs, and nj(dj , dj±1) :=
0.5
M−1 +
dj±1−2dj
2t +
Sj±1−Sj
2t ) for end CPs. Then, the price charged to
CPj for delay dj should satisfy the following constraint:
λnj(dj , dj±1)pj(dj) ≤
d0 − dj
t
(Sj + λrj) . (10)
Note that in contrast to the dual-purchasing scenario, this
price depends on the prioritization deals offered to CPj ’s
competitors.
The ISP’s choices: Lastly, the ISP’s profit is given by
Π = F +
M∑
j=1
λzjnj(dj , dj±1)(pj(dj)− C(dj)) .
where C(dj) is the per-user, per-unit of traffic, cost for
building additional infrastructure to provide a delay dj to the
nj(dj , dj±1) users of a prioritized provider CPj .
We first note that as the ISP’s profit is increasing in the
prioritization price of any CP, she will charge the maximum
possible price the CP is willing to pay. That is, the price
charged to CPj will bind (10).
The ISP further needs to determine her proposed QoS/delay
ds to all CPs simultaneously. Substituting for the price binding
(10), this will be given by the solution to
max
d, dj∈(0,d0]
M∑
j=1
(d0 − dj
t
(Sj + λrj) + λnj(dj , dj±1)C(dj))
)
.
H. Analysis under relaxations of Assumption 1
In this appendix, we discuss how several of our results
continue to hold qualitatively under relaxations of Assumption
1.
a) Small θ: no dual-purchasing: We begin by consider-
ing the violations of the lower bound set on θ in Part (2). When
θ is significantly small, no dual-purchasing behavior will exist
at equilibrium. The analysis of this case will lead to the single-
purchasing equilibrium outlined in Theorem 2. In particular,
this happens if θ <
Sj
V− 12
t
M−1−
1
2 (dj+1+dj)
, ∀j, and correspond
to the user choices outlined in cases 1 and 2 of Lemma 2. As
discussed in Section IV-B, the lack of dual-purchasing means
that all CPs (regardless of size and revenue model) will be
negatively impacted by prioritization of their competitors.
b) Large θ: no single-purchasing: We next consider the
violation of the upper bound set on θ in Part (2). We consider
a residual benefit rate such that θ >
Sj
V−dj−
t
M−1
, ∀j. Then,
all users will be dual-purchasing content, with or without
prioritization. In particular, each middle CP (end CP) will have
a total of nj = 2
1
M−1 (nj =
1
M−1 ) users and all these users
will be dual-purchasing. The number of each CP’s primary
providers will be given by the expressions in Theorem 1. Our
results will continue to hold qualitatively in this scenario. That
is, if a CP’s competitors are prioritized, the non-prioritized CP
will not lose users, but will lose primary users by the same
amount outlined in Corollary 1, and have a revenue change as
outlined in Corollary 2.
Finally, we consider relaxing the full coverage condition
of Part (1), by assuming V < d0 +
1
2
t
M−1 + minj Sj + F .
In this case, there exist users who do not have an incentive
to purchase from any of the content providers in the non-
prioritized equilibrium. By introducing prioritization, a signif-
icant decrease in dk, k ∈ argminj Sj can incentivize some
users to adopt CPk as their primary provider. The changes in
existing users’ preferences for content will follow the same
arguments as those of Theorem 1. This means that, consistent
with our original findings, a prioritized CP will gain additional
users, while a non-prioritized CP will not lose any users.
I. Market equilibrium under a non-uniform user distribution
In this appendix, we extend our analysis to non-uniform
distributions of users in the Hotelling model. This allows us
to account for the popularity of certain CPs even prior to
prioritization. Let F (x) denote the CDF of the distribution
of users in the Hotelling model. Then, the market equilibrium
is characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Assume the conditions in Assumption 1 are
satisfied. Let τj(dj) :=
1
t
(
V − dj −
Sj
θ
)
. Then,
1) A CPj , j ∈ [2,M − 1], with QoS/delay dj will have a
total of
nj = F (
j − 1
M − 1
+ τj(dj)) − F (
j − 1
M − 1
− τj(dj)) ,
users, with
nj1 = F (
j − 12
M − 1
+
dj+1 − dj
2t
)− F (
j − 32
M − 1
+
dj − dj−1
2t
) ,
of them being primary users, and the remainder as
secondary users.
2) CP1 and CPM will have a total of
n1 = F (τ1(d1)) ,
nM = 1− F (1− τM (dM ))
users, with
n11 = F (
1
2
M − 1
+
d2 − d1
2t
) ,
nM1 = 1− F (
M − 32
M − 1
+
dM − dM−1
2t
) ,
of them being primary users, and the remainder as
secondary users, respectively.
Further, in a prioritized regime, letting R¯(dj , dj±1) =
nj(dj)Sj + λ(rj(nj1(dj , dj±1) + δnj2(dj , dj±1)):
3) The QoS offered to CPj’s users in the fast lane will be
determined by
d∗ := arg max
d,dj∈(0,d0]
M∑
j=1
R¯(dj , dj±1)− R¯(d0, dj±1)
− λnj(dj)C(dj) .
4) CPj will be charged a prioritization fee of
pj(d
∗
j , dj±1) =
R¯j(d
∗
j , d
∗
j±1)− R¯j(d0, d
∗
j±1)
λnj(d∗j )
.
Proof: Our proof steps are largely similar to that of The-
orem 1, with the difference that the number of users attained
by each CP is now dependent on the user distribution CDF.
Users’ content consumption decisions: We begin by
finding users’ consumption patterns. Take users with j−1
M−1 ≤
x ≤ j
M−1 (that is, those who are primarily interested in CPj
and CPj+1’s content). These users will have four potential
consumption patterns: {j}, {j+1}, {j, j+1} and {j+1, j},
where {j,−j} (resp. {j}) is a bundle in which the user first
(resp. only) consumes content from CPj .
Let τSj (dj) =
1
t
(V −dj−
Sj
θ
). As the cutoff decision points
identified in Lemma 2 are independent of users’ distributions,
the consumption choices of these users will again be given by
• Users with j−1
M−1 < x <
j
M−1 − τ
S
j+1(dj+1) single
purchase on CPj , leading to F (
j
M−1 − τj+1(dj+1)) −
F ( j−1
M−1 ) such users,
• Users with j
M−1 − τ
S
j+1(dj+1) < x <
j− 12
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t
dual purchase with primary CPj , leading to F (
j− 12
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t )− F (
j
M−1 − τ
S
j+1(dj+1)) such users,
• Users with
j− 12
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t < x <
j−1
M−1 + τ
S
j (dj)
dual purchase with primary CPj+1, leading to F (
j−1
M−1 +
τSj (dj))− F (
j− 12
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t ) such users,
• Users with j−1
M−1 + τ
S
j (dj) < x <
j
M−1 single purchase
on CPj+1, leading to F (
j
M−1 )−F (
j−1
M−1 +τ
S
j (dj)) such
users.
To find the mass of primary and secondary users of each CP,
we should integrate the above regions over the cdf of users’
distribution in the Hotelling model, for all regions in which the
CPs have competitors. This leads to total and primary users:
nj = F (
j − 1
M − 1
+ τj(dj))− F (
j − 1
M − 1
− τj(dj)) ,
nj1 = F (
j − 12
M − 1
+
dj+1 − dj
2t
)− F (
j − 32
M − 1
+
dj − dj−1
2t
) ,
for a non-end CPj . The users for the end CPs can be found
similarly.
CPs’ prioritization decisions: Given users’ consumption
choices, we observe that if a CPj lowers his offered delay
dj , then he will serve a larger mass of the user market.
This includes changes in both primary and secondary users.
We evaluate the changes in a CP’s revenue when opting for
prioritization (accounting for the change in his users), so as
to determine the incentive of the CP for paying prioritization
fees.
We know that the net revenue of CPj (without prioritization
fees) is given by
R¯(dj , dj±1) := nj(dj)Sj + λ(rj(nj1(dj , dj±1) + δnj2(dj , dj±1)) .
(11)
Note that the revenue when CPj does not opt for prioritization
can be obtained by setting dj = d0 and zj = 0 in (11).
Then, CPj will have an incentive to pay the required prior-
itization price if the CP’s revenue given in (11) increases fol-
lowing prioritization compared to his no prioritization revenue
at d0. In particular, the prioritization price for delay dj should
be such that R¯j(dj , dj±1) − λnj(dj)pj(dj) ≥ R¯j(d0, dj±1),
or equivalently, that
pj(dj) ≤
R¯j(dj , dj±1)− R¯j(d0, dj±1)
λnj(dj)
(12)
The ISP’s choices: Lastly, the ISP’s profit is given by
Π = F +
M∑
j=1
λzjnj(dj)(pj(dj)− C(dj)) .
where C(dj) is the per-user, per-unit of traffic, cost for
building additional infrastructure to provide a delay dj to the
nj(dj) users of a prioritized provider CPj .
We first note that as the ISP’s profit is increasing in the
prioritization price of any CP, she will charge the maximum
possible price the CP is willing to pay. That is, the price
charged to CPj will bind (12). The ISP will then jointly
maximize the delays offered to all CPs, as the price charged
to each CP depends on that charged to the CPs’ competitors.
If the prioritization arrangements are exclusive, the ISP will
make the offer to the CP(s) from whom she can extract the
most profit.
Comparison with findings under uniform user distribu-
tions (Theorem 1): From the above theorem, we observe that
as CPs’ total number of users nj depends only on their own dj ,
similar to the uniform case, no CP will lose users when his
competitors are prioritized. However, a non-prioritized CPj
will again lose primary users n1j to a prioritized competitor;
for instance, when dj+1 is lowered, F (
j− 12
M−1 +
dj+1−dj
2t )
decreases, lowering the primary users of CPj . We further
observe that this decrease is sharper for CPs that are originally
more “popular”, in that more users are intrinsically interested
in their content, as the cdf of users’ distribution f(·) (hence,
the rate of change of F (·)) is higher around these CPs.
Conversely, CPs that are competing with more popular content
providers stand to gain more users through paid prioritization.
However, in contrast to Theorem 1, the prioritization prices
offered to each CP will depend on those offered to their
competitors.
